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Abstract
The UK government’s 2014 Budget proposed major pension liberalisation for retirees from 2015, which 
will allow them to draw their pension savings in any form they choose at any time they choose from age 
55 onwards. Until now, the majority of  retirees have turned their pension pots into income by buying a 
lifetime annuity. However, annuity rates have fallen steeply over the last 25 years and ‘annuity bashing’ has 
becomes something of  a national sport in the UK. Thus the proposed liberalisation looks politically astute 
by playing to popular sentiment, and some commentators have predicted that a huge permanent decline 
in the sale of  lifetime annuities will result. Contrary to the dominant view, this paper argues that many 
lifetime annuities do in fact offer fair value for money and the protection against longevity risk is probably 
poorly understood by consumers. The fall in annuity rates has been due primarily to rising longevity, 
which does not reduce value for money, and post-crisis monetary policies, which although prolonged are 
not a permanent feature of  the economy. While the types and features of  annuities on offer may need to 
adapt, this much maligned financial product should ideally still play a key role in most people’s retirement 
planning and in the free, impartial guidance for every retiree promised as part of  the government’s pension 
liberalisation package.
Background
In its 2014 Budget, the UK government (HM Treasury, 2014a) announced that from April 2015 its citizens 
entering retirement will no longer be steered towards using their tax-advantaged pension savings to buy 
a lifetime annuity (a financial product where a lump sum is exchanged for an income for life), or indeed to 
securing an income at all. Instead retirees will have complete freedom to draw out their savings whenever 
and however they like, provided they have reached at least age 55. This new pension liberalisation ap-
plies to all defined contribution (DC)-type pension savings. DC schemes are a type of  pension arrange-
mentcharacterised by an accumulation phase during which the individual builds up their own personal 
pot of  savings and a decumulation phase, where these are used to buy or fund income in retirement, with 
the individual directly bearing the risks inherent in both phases. The key risks are: investment risk, being 
the risk that invested pension contributions do not grow enough to support the intended level of  retirement 
consumption; inflation risk, whereby the intended retirement consumption fails to be achieved because the 
investment returns and/or income in retirement do not keep pace withprice increases; and longevity risk, 
being the twin risk of  either outliving the pot of  savings or living on a lower income than necessary with a 
consequent unintentional bequest at death. This contrasts with defined benefit (DB) and hybrid arrange-
ments, where some or all of  these risks are borne by another agent (typically an employer or theState), 
giving the individual a more certain retirement outcome.
In the UK, a quarter of  pension savings can be taken at the start of  the decumulation phase as a taxfree 
lump sum and, under the liberalisation policy as originally announced, this option is to remain (HM Trea-
sury, 2014a, p19). It will be permissible to draw the remaining savings as one or more lump sums, as in-
come or a combination of  both, taxed at the individual’s normal tax rates. This contrasts with the pre- 2015 
system, where lump sum withdrawals in excess of  the tax-free sum would typically be taxed at a punitive 
55 per cent rate.
Where, post-2015, an individual decides to draw savings as income, they could opt to use current 
products which are chiefly lifetime annuities and income drawdown.  With a lifetime annuity, the pension 
pot is exchanged irrevocably for a promised income for life; the promise is backed mainly by fixed-interest 
investments. Under income drawdown, the bulk of  the pension pot remains invested, usually with a 
substantial proportion in equities, and ad hoc or periodic withdrawals are made to provide an income 
stream whose amount may vary. The UK government expects pension liberalisation to stimulate the 
development of  new products as well. Other UK government policy initiatives and experience in other 
countries suggest the form that some of  these products might take.  Some may occupy a middle space 
between traditional DC and DB pensions – a space that the UK government has called ‘defined ambition’ 
(DA) and which offers the individual more certainty of  retirement outcome than pure DC but falls short of  
the fixed promises of  DB arrangements (DWP, 2013).  Reversing its earlier views (DWP, 2009, p12), the 
government has signalled that it now favours large-scale multi-employer collective DC (CDC) schemes 
in this middle space (Prime Minister’s Office, 2014, pp35-37). In CDC schemes, there is a target pension 
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with a cross subsidy between either members of  the whole scheme or members of  particular cohorts 
within the scheme, so that returns are smoothed both over time and between members. However, unlike 
DB schemes, the target pension may be cut and/or member contributions raised when faced with adverse 
financial, economic and/or demographic conditions.  Other new products are likely to offer retirement 
incomes that can start, or flex upwards, on the occurrence of  specified events, such as the individual 
needing care (Commission on Funding of  Care and Support, 2011, p40), their pension savings running 
out or, as is common in the USA, on reaching a specified older age (Turner and McCarthy, 2013). These 
newer products may be based on deferred annuities, drawdown, and other more innovative strategies. 
These decumulation options under the new pension liberalisation proposal are summarised in Figure 1, 
which highlights the trade-off  between income security and flexibility and between using pensions to 
address a single financial goal – income in retirement – and the somewhat riskier strategy of  using these 
savings to address multiple goals.
Figure 1: Options under DC pension liberalisation
Pension Pot
25% tax  
free
lump sum
Drawdown
Main uses:
Gifts and bequests
Provide income
Main uses:
Provide income
Main uses:
Spend
Payoff  debts
Save
Gifts and bequests
Provide income
Main uses:
Will vary depending on
flexibilities,guarantees
and contingencies  
built in
AnnuityOther 
products
Full 
Withdrawal
(at normal income 
 tax rate)
Risk of running out of income or leaving unintentional bequests
Flexibility and ability to make intentional bequests
Higher Lower
Higher Lower
Until Budget 2014, apart from the tax-free lump sum, most retirees had to draw their pension savings as 
income. The exceptions were those with small pension pots (up to £18,000 in total before 27 March 2014, 
or individual pots up to £2,000), who could draw the whole as a lump sum, and those with pension pots 
large enough to bring their retirement income up to a minimum secure level – requiring pension savings 
of  around £300,000 or more (HM Treasury, 2014a). These limits have been relaxed somewhat post-Bud-
get in anticipation of  the 2015 liberalisation. With the average (mean) pension pot being £35,600 and 
median only £20,000 (ABI, 2014), the vast majority of  people have had little choice but to buy an annuity. 
As a result of  this near-compulsion, the UK annuity market had grown to be the largest in the world with 
annual sales in 2013 of  nearly £12 billion (ABI, 2014).
Immediate reactions to Budget 2014 suggested that pension liberalisation would cause a huge fall in 
the market. For example: Legal & General predicted that annuity sales will halve (Cumbo, 2014); shares 
in annuity specialists fell on the day of  the Budget - Just Retirement by 40 per cent (Selby, 2014) and 
Partnership Assurance by 55 per cent (Watt, 2014); a month later, MGM Advantage, a specialist annuity 
provider, announced it was cutting its staff  by a third (Sells, 2014). Certainly, annuity sales have fallen 
markedly following the Budget announcement. This may reflect consumers temporarily deferring their 
retirement decisions until 2015; but possibly the pundits are correct in suggesting that this marks the start 
of  a permanent shift away from what seems to have become a very unpopular product.
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The trend in annuity rates
It’s not difficult to see why retirees have become disenchanted with annuities.  Over the last 25 years, 
annuity rates have fallen significantly meaning that individuals now have to build up a much greater 
pension pot if  they are to retire at the same age as previously on the same nominal income. For example, 
taking as an indicator the standard level annuity for  a single man aged 65, the rate has fallen from £1,537 
per year for each £10,000 invested at the end of  1990 to £570 a year by end 2013 (Burrows, 2014). Put 
another way, an individual who wanted to start retirement with a nominal income of  £10,000 would have 
needed a pension pot of  £65,000 in 1990 but over £175,000 by 2013. 
Unsurprisingly then, ‘annuity bashing’ has become something of  a national sport in the UK in recent 
years. Press comments such as ‘the awful value offered by annuity providers’ (Somerset Webb, 2014) are 
commonplace. Shortly before Budget 2014, the UK regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA, 2014) 
published a damning review of  the industry, suggesting that providers could be making supernormal 
profits from consumer failure to shop around adequately when buying annuities. A small survey by the 
Financial Times (Gray, 2014) backed this up, reporting profit margins of  around 6 to 8 per cent for annuity 
providers selling on the open market (i.e. to consumers who must by definition be shopping around) 
but 13 to 15 per cent for providers selling annuities mainly to their existing customers. The FCA (2014) 
also found that consumers with small pension pots were likely to be offered poor annuity rates and little 
choice of  provider.  Altman (Treasury Committee, 2014, Question 274) has commented that: ‘the average 
annuity and the annuity that most people would have been buying that they had been rolled into from their 
existing pension provider now represents such poor value it is difficult to imagine the value worsening. The 
estimates that I have made … would require the purchaser to live well into their 90s before they got any 
more than their own fund back’.  
On the face of  it, these views seem at odds with the contention in this paper that annuities could in fact be 
delivering fair value for money. However, if  the nature of  lifetime annuities and the determinants of  annuity 
rates are unpacked, a more nuanced interpretation emerges.
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The longevity problem
Individuals and households have many goals in later life, not least perhaps leaving bequests to the next 
generation. However, a primary goal for most individuals when they reach the decumulation phase of  
retirement planning is how to maximise income while ensuring that the income lasts for as long as they 
need it, in other words until death. What makes this planning challenging is that the date of  death is 
unknown. 
Figure 2 shows the expected distribution of  deaths for UK men and women aged 55, 65, 75, 85 and 95 in 
2014. The chart is based on predicted cohort probabilities for these groups derived from official period life 
tables for the population as a whole (ONS, 2014a). While period life tables give a snapshot in a particular 
year for all age groups (i.e. with diverse years of  birth), cohort tables track the experience of  a given 
cohort (sharing the same year of  birth) year after year and so take into account predicted improvements 
in mortality. For example, starting with the probability, q
65
 , of  dying at age 65 in 2014, the cohort table is 
constructed by taking q
66
 in 2015, q
67 
in 2016, and so on. The published life tables stop at age 100 and so, 
in this study, probabilities for ages 101 to 120 have been roughly estimated assuming a steady geometric 
decay. Based on the cohort table, the probability for each cohort of  dying at each age, x, was calculated 
as the cumulative year-by-year probability of  surviving until age x multiplied by probability of  dying aged 
x. Mathematically, this can be expressed as :
                                                                                                 
 [1]
where 
t|1
q
x
 is the probability of  dying in the year when age x is reached having survived for t years since 
the starting age, n, and (1 – qi) is the probability of  surviving each one-year period included in t.
The difficulty for individuals is that (excepting cases of  terminal illness) they cannot know with any 
certainty where on the curve for their age cohort their own death will lie. Consider, for example, the cohort 
of  men aged 65 in 2014 (the solid black line in Figure 2). The mean and median ages of  death are both 
around 86, while the most common age of  death (mode) is 89. However, by definition, most people are 
not average. An unfortunate 1.2 per cent of  the cohort will not live until 66, while 6.7 per cent can expect to 
live beyond age 100. An individual might look to the ages at which their parents died as a rough guide to 
their own date of  death, but this takes no account of  the increasing longevity from one cohort to the next 
because of  medical advances and so on. It is also unlikely that an individual will have sufficient knowledge 
of  their parents’ lifestyles to know whether their own habits are comparable and so could be contributing 
to longevity in a similar or divergent way. Results from the UK Wealth and Assets Survey (ONS cited in 
Crawford and Tetlow, 2012) suggest that over half  of  individuals currently don’t think about how many 
years they might spend in retirement and, of  those that do, men tend to underestimate their remaining 
lifespan by around two years and women by four years.
Thus, there is no reliable way for an individual to make use of  the information in Figure 2. As Figure 3(a) 
shows, the individual could aim to run their pension savings down to zero by the average life expectancy 
of  the group; this would produce a relatively high income but also a high risk of  running out of  income 
before death. Another option, as shown in Figure 3(b), would be to eke out the pension savings until a high 
age, such as 100 or beyond; but this entails a high risk of  dying earlier and so leaving an unintentional 
bequest, meanwhile living on a less than optimal income.  While the individual cannot solve this puzzle 
alone, Yaari (1965) showed that insurance could. When the pension savings of  many individuals are 
pooled, the insurer can pay out an income approaching that in Figure 3(a) because the remaining savings 
of  those who die earlier than average subsidise the continuing income for those who die later (the mortality 
subsidy). Thus, insurance in the form of  annuities provides a way – even the only way (Blake, 2001, p.1) – 
to maximise retirement income. 
Despite this strong case for annuities as insurance against outliving one’s savings, experience in the USA 
and most other parts of  the world where annuitisation is optional is that few retirees choose to annuitise 
their retirement savings, a conundrum dubbed the ‘annuity puzzle’ (Brown, 2007).  A key question for the 
UK is: once retirees are freed from near-compulsory annuitisation, will they also shun annuities?
n+t-
t|
q
χ=q(n+t)∏       (-qi)i=n
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Figure 2: Distribution of  deaths for (a) men and (b) women given selected ages now
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Figure 3: Income and wealth without annuitisation
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(a): Run wealth to zero by average (mean) age of  death
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(b) Run down wealth to age 100
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Based on male aged 65 with life expectancy in 2014 from ONS (2014a) UK cohort ex principle protection.  
Assumes wealth invested and earns 15-year gilt return from Bank of  England (2014). 
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Value for money
As with any insurance product, decisions about whether or not to buy are likely to be strongly influenced 
by price. One way of  assessing the value for money offered by an annuity is to look at the extent to which 
it is ‘actuarially fair’. An annuity is defined as actuarially fair if  its expected discounted present value 
(EDPV) equals the price paid. To calculate the EDPV, the discounted value of  the total annuity payments 
to a person dying at each age is worked out and then each of  those totals is multiplied by the probability 
of  dying at that age. The sum of  these probable payouts gives the EDPV. Mathematically, this can be 
expressed as:
                                                                                                                  
 
[2]                                                                                  
where
                                                                                                                     
 
 [3]
where Ai is the cumulative discounted payout from the annuity from purchase at age, n, to age of  death, t;  
t|1
q
i
 is the probability of  surviving to exactly age t; a
j
 is the nominal payout each period and r
j
 is the discount 
rate for each period.  
If  the EDPV equals the price paid then its ratio to price will be 1. This ratio is commonly called the Money 
Worth Ratio (MWR) and is a standard way of  evaluating annuities. In practice, the ratio will normally be less 
than 1 since the insurer incurs costs including normal profit. If  there is a lack of  effective competition, the 
insurer might also be making supernormal profit, in which case the MWR could be substantially less than 
1. Individuals should be willing to buy the annuity, provided the gap between the EDPV and the annuity 
price does not exceed the value they place on the insurance element of  the annuity – in effect this gap can 
be thought of  as the premium for the longevity insurance. 
The calculation of  EDPV is heavily dependent on both the chosen discount rate and assumptions about 
life expectancy. Following the method used by the World Bank in its 1999 comparative survey of  annuities 
(James and Vittas, 1999), in this present study, probabilities have been based on cohort life data as 
described in the previous section and the discount rate is the term structure for UK government bonds 
(gilts) (Bank of  England, 2014). The results of  calculating the MWR in this way are shown in Tables 1 
and 2. Table 1 shows results based on the average best three standard (i.e. non-enhanced) annuity 
rates available in February 2014 and Table 2, based on the worst rate. Annuity rates were sourced from 
Moneyfacts (2014, p.38).
EDPV =∑ ti= n Ai .t|qj
A
i=∑ tj= n ∏ij= n
aj
(+rj)
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Table 1: Value for money of  UK annuities and effective premium charged,  
   February 2014 – best three rates
Age at which annuity purchased
55 60 65 70 75
Average of  best 3 annuity rates [1] 
£pa/£10,000
£447 £495 £557 £630 £745
MWR (decimal) and effective premium (%)
Men, standard life expectancy [2] 0.9237
7.63%
0.9152
8.48%
0.9013
9.87%
0.8543
14.57%
0.8126
18.74%
Men, High life expectancy variant [3] 0.9590
4.10%
0.9505
4.95%
0.9354
6.46%
0.8854
11.46%
0.8406
15.94%
Women, standard life expectancy [2] 0.9828
1.72%
0.9874
1.26%
0.9859
1.41%
0.9526
4.74%
0.9235
7.65%
Women, high life expectancy variant [3] 1.0158
-1.58%
1.0208
-2.08%
1.0187
-1.87%
0.9832
1.68%
0.9516
4.84%
[1] Sourced from Moneyfacts (2014). Standard ie non-enhanced annuity rates, single-life level without guarantee, monthly paid in advance.
[2] Calculated using data from ONS (2014a) UK period qx principle protection. 
[3] Calculated using data from ONS (2014a) UK period qx high variant protection. 
Table 2: Value for money of  UK annuities and effective premium charged, February 2014 – worst rate
Age at which annuity purchased
55 60 65 70 75
Worst annuity rate [1] £pa/£10,000 £402 £445 £499 £573 £679
MWR (decimal) and effective premium (%)
Men, standard life  
expectancy [2]
0.8313
16.87%
0.8233
17.67%
0.8070
19.30%
0.7775
22.25%
0.7403
25.97%
Men, High life expectancy variant 
[3]
0.8631
13.69%
0.8550
14.50%
0.8375
16.25%
0.8058
19.42%
0.7658
23.42%
Women, standard life expectancy 
[2]
0.8845
11.55%
0.8882
11.18%
0.8827
11.73%
0.8669
13.31%
0.8413
15.87%
Women, high life  
expectancy variant [3]
0.9142
8.58%
0.9183
8.17%
0.9121
8.79%
0.8947
10.53%
0.8669
13.31%
[1] Sourced from Moneyfacts (2014). Standard ie non-enhanced annuity rates, single-life level without guarantee, monthly paid in advance.
[2] Calculated using data from ONS (2014a) UK period qx principle protection. 
[3] Calculated using data from ONS (2014a) UK period qx high variant protection. 
The choice of  data used in the calculations in the tables warrants some explanation. The calculations 
are based on the purchase of  a level annuity (single life, without guarantee, monthly paid in advance), 
not because this is the most suitable product for supporting consumption throughout retirement - an 
inflation-linked annuity would better match that need - but because level annuities are the most commonly 
purchased type of  annuity in the UK, accounting for some 87 per cent of  sales by volume (ABI cited in 
House of  Commons Library, 2014, p.4). In the first three-quarters of  2013, only 6 per cent of  purchasers 
bought an escalating annuity which would include both inflation-linked versions and those escalating at 
a fixed rate (Ibid).  Bear in mind, too, that these published annuity rates are those available to consumers 
who shop around – the unpublished rates offered by providers to their existing customers are often lower: 
the FCA (2014, p.10) found that 80 per cent of  retirees could get a better rate by shopping around.
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Turning to life expectancy, the data used here are for the population as a whole, whereas insurers will base 
annuity rates on data for their own customer base. Individuals purchasing annuities tend to have higher 
life expectancy than the population as a whole (James and Vittas, 1999, pp. 6, 11; Cannon and Tonks, 
2005, p.59). This can be seen by comparing the life tables for the population as a whole with annuitant life 
tables. One plausible reason is that the people who can afford to save for retirement are more likely to have 
higher incomes and as discussed in ONS (2014b, p.3), several studies have found an association between 
longevity and income.  As already discussed above, UK legislation already allows small pension pots to 
be taken wholly as cash and this may be most relevant and attractive to low-income individuals who have 
been able to save little and can also expect a large proportion of  their income to be replaced in any case 
by their state pension. Cannon and Tonks (2005, pp.62-73) review a range of  other theories to explain 
higher annuitant life expectancy but a discussion of  these is outside the scope of  this present paper. The 
key point is that, using population rather than annuitant life data is likely to underestimate longevity and so 
understate the actual MWR. To make some adjustment for this, Tables 1 and 2 include MWRs calculated 
not just on the standard life expectancy data for the population as a whole, but also the ONS’s high variant 
projections which are likely to be closer to annuitant life data.
Choosing the gilt yield curve as the source of  discount rates is consistent with a highly risk averse 
consumer looking for income certainty – the type of  individual for whom an annuity would be ideally suited. 
The alternative to buying an annuity for this individual could be to buy a series of  gilts of  varying terms to 
redemption from short to long that would deliver a secure income. Even so, this theoretical do-it-yourself  
consumer would not be able to remove longevity risk since the UK government does not issue any type of  
longevity bond (and there would of  course also be explicit transaction costs for the gilts which have not 
been factored into the discount rate).
A noticeable feature of  Table 1 is that in some cases the MWR is greater than 1, meaning that the annuity 
consumer is getting more than value for money. This is consistent with the findings in other studies (James 
and Vittas, 1999; Cannon and Tonks, 2006, p5). Moreover, a value of  MWR greater than 1 does not suggest 
that the insurer is making a loss. Although, from the consumer perspective, it seems valid to discount 
using gilt rates since this is a likely alternative choice for a risk averse retiree, insurers do not in fact usually 
back their promise to pay the annuity income entirely with gilts. Coatesworth and Dimitriou (2013) found 
that in 2011 AAA assets (largely gilts) account for between 3 and 43 per cent of  assets backing annuities 
for a sample of  providers. Other assets typically comprise corporate bonds, mortgages and mortgage-
backed securities which offer higher yields than gilts (which have delivered historically low returns due to 
the monetary policies adopted since the 2007 global financial crisis). What this suggests is that annuities 
are not in fact quite as low risk as consumers may generally assume. However, ultimately (since they are 
insurance products) 90 per cent of  the promises under UK annuities are backed to an unlimited extent 
by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS, undated)  in the event that an insurer defaults. 
In addition, the European Solvency II regulations, now due to come into effect in January 2016 (European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), undated), should strengthen the level of  
reserves held to the extent that an insurer’s assets do not already reasonably match the annuity liabilities 
(EIOPA, 2013). Experts (for example, Joannes, undated) have predicted that Solvency II may cause a 
worsening in rates of  around 10 per cent (which would reduce the MWR figures shown in the tables). 
However, to the extent that Solvency II is already anticipated, some shift in asset allocation may already be 
reflected in annuity rates on which the tables are based. 
Table 1 shows that, for the best annuity rates, the MWR at all ages for women and at ages 55 to 70 for men 
is greater than 0.8500.  Cannon and Tonks (2006, p5) state that the usual range for the value for MWR 
is 0.85 to 1.05, with up to 0.12 accounting for costs, and that results within this range do not suggest an 
excessive mark-up by the provider.  By contrast, Table 2 shows that the worst rates, in most cases, offer 
poor value for money to men, the exceptions being men with higher-than-average life expectancy aged 
55 or 60. Even the worst rates generally deliver value for money to women, with the exception of  those with 
standard life expectancy aged 75. 
Taking the two tables together, the results suggest consumer detriment to those male annuity purchasers 
who end up on the worst rates, but otherwise a product that is generally delivering value for money. The 
findings tend to support the UK policy focus on encouraging annuity consumers to shop around and 
switch providers in order to get the best annuity rates (ABI, 2012; Financial Conduct Authority, 2014), but 
do not suggest that consumers should be shunning annuities across the board on the basis of  value for 
money, even though annuity rates are low.
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Why annuity rates are low
The major determinants of  annuity rates are life expectancy and long-term interest rates. For example, a 
simple linear regression of  UK level annuity rates for a 65-year-old man against a benchmark 15-year gilt 
rate and cohort life expectancy using monthly data over the period 1991 to 2013 explains 97 per cent of   
the variation in the annuity rate (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Regression of  level annuity rate [1] against long-term gilt rate and life expectancy, 1991-2013
Gilt rate [1] Life expectancy [2]
R2 0.971  
F(2,274)=4657.648 ρ<0.001
Standard coefficient 
(β)
0.484
ρ <0.001
-0.519
ρ <0.001
[1] Data from Burrows (2014). ). Level annuity rate without guarantee for 65-year old man.
[2] Data from ONS (2014a). Cohort life expectancy for attained age 65 in each year. Monthly data extrapolated by assuming constant compound 
rate of  change between annual data points.
A fall in annuity rates associated with increasing life expectancy does not equate to a fall in value for 
money, rather it represents a spreading of  value over a longer period. Moreover, to the extent that rising 
cohort longevity increases uncertainty about individual longevity, there may even be an increase in the 
value of  the insurance that the annuity provides. 
A fall in interest rates affects all types of  saving, not just annuities. UK long-term gilt rates, along with the 
rate of  return on other assets, have been driven to particularly low levels since the global financial crisis 
that started in 2007 through the monetary policies adopted by the Bank of  England. In the normal way, the 
Bank sets its base rate which then ripples through the money and bond markets to determine the general 
level of  interest rates across the economy. In March 2009, the Bank’s base rate was reduced to 0.5 per 
cent, considered to be the zero lower bound in the UK – in other words, the point at which conventional, 
interest-based monetary policy becomes ineffective because nominal base rates cannot be reduced 
below 0 per cent. To continue exerting downward pressure on interest rates, the Bank of  England adopted 
the unconventional monetary policies of  quantitative and qualitative easing. These entailed direct buying 
of  gilts and commercial bonds from banks and other agents, pushing up the prices of  these assets and 
so forcing their yields lower. Investors, with surplus cash from the Bank’s purchases, similarly turned 
to buying other higher-yielding assets and through this process the downward pressure on interest 
rates filtered through the wider asset markets. These policies, which aimed to stimulate real investment 
(fixed capital formation by firms) and ease pressure on borrowers, may have averted a more prolonged 
recession and even financial collapse, so in that sense it could be argued that annuity purchasers have, 
along with everyone else, benefited from these monetary policies. However, the cost of  these policies 
does fall more heavily on savers than other citizens, with the former suffering a prolonged period of  low 
interest rates. While most savers can hope to see some future recovery in the return from their capital, 
what distinguishes lifetime annuities is the locking into a level of  interest rates at the point of  purchase 
with no possibility of  benefiting later should interest rates recover. Annuitants who have exchanged their 
capital for annuity income in recent years are now permanently locked into those low rates. Therefore 
lifetime annuities are unattractive as an investment during periods when interest rates are low, which may 
outweigh the value placed on the longevity insurance.  A policy solution could certainly be to allow greater 
flexibility in the timing of  annuity purchase, but such a policy should not lose sight of  the need to address 
longevity risk.
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Perceived value
Other research questions whether annuity purchasers place any value at all on the longevity insurance 
inherent in lifetime annuities. In particular, Brown et al (2008), puzzled by annuity aversion in the USA, set 
out to test whether a framing effect could be the explanation. They argued that valuing annuities in terms 
of  the MWR is to view them through a consumption frame, focusing on what can be spent throughout the 
remaining life course. By contrast, if  individuals are using an investment frame, the focus will be on rate of  
return and investment risk, but not longevity risk. Brown et al neatly explain this by considering a two-period 
example. In Period 1, the individual invests wealth, W, while in Period 2 he or she consumes the whole 
proceeds. If  the individual invests in a bond with return r, the amount available for consumption is W(1 + r). 
If  the individual invests in an annuity, the amount available for consumption is W(1+r)(1 –q) where q is the 
probability of  dying before Period 2. Thus, viewed through an investment frame, the annuity now looks to 
be more, not less, risky than direct investment in a bond, because there is a risk of  not living long enough to 
receive the proceeds of  the annuity, while the bond will pay out regardless. 
Brown et al tested for the existence of  this framing effect by surveying a sample of  1,342 people aged 50 
and over, who were divided into groups each of  which was asked to choose between options described 
in different ways. They found that, while respondents asked to choose between options using the 
consumption frame favoured the concept of  annuities, those whose options were described using an 
investment frame placed a neutral or negative value on the insurance aspect of  an annuity. Based on 
these results, Brown et al queried why providers fail to market annuities using a consumption frame. They 
suggested a number of  reason, for example: the disjoint it would create with the accumulation phase 
where the emphasis is firmly on investment return; the cost and complexity of  converting consumers from 
that investment frame to a consumption frame once they reach the point of  retirement; the risk that the 
effort involved in converting consumers would not be rewarded if  they then switched to other lower cost 
providers; and the way in which commission systems in the USA favour the sale of  investment-oriented 
products (as they also have until recently in the UK). 
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The implications for pre-retirement advice
A key component of  the UK government’s 2014 Budget pension proposals is that pension liberalisation 
will be accompanied by a guarantee that ‘individuals approaching retirement will receive free and impartia 
face-to-face guidance to help them make the choices that best suit their needs’ (HM Treasury, 2014a, p.3 ).
This was misleading described in the Budget speech itself  as being ‘offered free, impartial, face-to-face 
advice’ (Osborne, 2014) and has been the subject of  debate since. The muddled terminology belies a 
deeper confusion about retirees’ needs and the feasibility of  meeting them, only partially allayed in the 
subsequent feedback to consultation on the changes (HM Treasury, 2014b).
The analysis above underscores how essential it is for guidance or advice to help consumers understand 
the nature of  longevity risk and how to protect against it. In addition, a number of  other related issues need 
to be resolved if  the guidance or advice is to be effective:
When will guidance be offered? Retirement is becoming increasingly flexible so that it may become 
harder to identify a single period that can appropriately be identified as ‘approaching retirement’. 
Given that individuals will be free to draw their pension savings in as many tranches as they choose, 
guidancemay be needed more than once. 
Is it the case that individuals ‘will receive’ or will be ‘offered’ guidance? In some complex areas of  
financial planning, notably equity release (where capital tied up in home ownership is converted to cash 
lump sums or income without moving home), FCA rules require that all retail consumers receive advice 
unless they are defined as ‘high net worth’ customers or refuse the advice in writing (FCA, 2014, rules 
MCOB 8.6A.1 and 8.6A.4). A pension pot and a home are the two largest assets that most individuals 
will ever own and both are designed to meet essential needs (consumption in retirement and shelter), so 
the parallel of  withdrawing wealth from a pension pot and wealth from housing are close. There are many 
common decision points, for example, the risk of  choices now limiting options later, the interaction of  the 
tax and benefit system with the choices made, and the possible availability of  alternative courses of  action 
to resolve whatever need has prompted the intention to withdraw wealth (for example, paying off  debts, 
coping with disability, and so on). So there would seem to be a strong case for applying similar rules to 
pension liberalisation decisions. Indeed, it seems perverse that advice would not be compulsory in this 
area: the government has stated that professional advice will be compulsory for members of  defined 
benefit schemes who wish to transfer to DC schemes from April 2015 onwards (HM Treasury, 2014b); so 
there seems an inconsistency in failing to offer the same safeguard to DC members who are contemplating 
giving up aspects of  their retirement security.
Will guidance be sufficient? The distinction between guidance and advice has been described by, for 
example, Thoresen (2008 p45). Typically, guidance is non-specific, in the sense that it does not relate 
to an individual’s particular circumstances (only to a group of  people in situations similar to those of  the 
individual), does not advocate a particular course of  action (suggesting only the range of  options that 
people in such a situation might typically or sometimes consider) and does not recommend the purchase, 
sale or alteration of  particular regulated products (which would include pension plans, annuities, 
drawdown products, and so on) from particular providers. It seems likely that many, if  not most, individuals 
approaching retirement would need to be directed to an authorised financial adviser for regulated advice, 
which begs the question whether guidance has a role at all beyond signposting to sources of  authorised 
advice.
Can the advice really be described as ‘free’? In a welcome government U-turn, the advice will no 
longer be delivered by providers (as originally proposed) and instead by independent bodies, such 
as the Pensions Advisory Service, Money Advice Service and other third-party partners (HM Treasury, 
2014b). Since the advice will be paid for through a levy on  financial services industry (not simply 
pension providers) (HM Treasury, 2014c), it seems inevitable that the cost will ultimately be passed on 
to consumers through the charges for financial  products. This sits uneasily alongside the recent Retail 
Distribution Review reforms which, since 1 January 2013, have required that the cost of  regulated advice 
be transparent and separate from product charges (Financial Services Authority, 2012). It may be more 
honest to drop the adjective ‘free’ and make clear that the cost of  the advice will ultimately be included in 
the charges for products purchased. This could have a positive benefit in promoting high take-up of  advice 
since the retiree will have paid for it anyway.
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Conclusions
While retirees’ long-term response to the new pension liberalisation from 2015 and the form of  any 
guidance is as yet uncertain, it is clear that annuities can offer good value for money based on the MWR, 
while nonetheless being perceived as a poor investment.  Therefore, an important facet of  any guidance 
given to individuals approaching retirement will be assessing their level of  risk aversion and, if  it is high, 
making sure that they understand the protection that an annuity product offers against longevity risk. 
This requires a shift in the way advice is framed, away from an investment frame, to a consumption frame, 
and represents a significant financial education challenge. This is not to say that annuity products are the 
right choice for everyone. Other strategies and products may be more suitable for those with higher risk 
tolerance, greater resources and/or a desire to leave bequests. Similarly, those with low resources who 
can expect a high level of  pre-retirement income to be replaced by their state pension may sensibly derive 
greater benefit from taking cash lump sums rather than a pension, especially if  their pension pot is small. 
Individuals with debts, such as an outstanding mortgage, may find that the reduction in after-tax spending 
from paying off  the debts outweighs the loss of  pension income by taking cash to fund the repayment, 
especially if  their life expectancy is standard or poor. Moreover, those who have significantly shortened life 
expectancy - for example, due to terminal illness - could be better off  taking cash. Nonetheless, given the 
huge risk that uncertain longevity poses for retirees, there is a strong case for retaining annuity products in 
the mix of  options. The results in this paper also confirm that there is a substantial gap between the MWRs 
for the best annuities and the worst, underlining the ongoing importance of  policies encouraging, or even 
requiring, retirees to shop around for the best value annuities.
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